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Abstract 
Patent Pledges are initiatives of patent owners in which they announce the free or reasonable availability 
of active patents. Many firms struggle to understand the rationales behind these strategies, making it 
difficult to decide whether or not to trust them. After all, respective patent owners could also let the 
patents lapse to make them available. So, what do patent owners hope to achieve through these 
initiatives? Existing literature suggests motives for patent pledges, but lacks academic rigor and empirical 
evidence. To further our understanding of patent pledges, we conducted 30 expert interviews, including 
people directly involved in the decision to initiate and to execute patent pledges. As a complementary 
data source, we qualitatively analysed 50 public patent pledge statements with respect to their 
underlying motives. We found 13 distinct motives belonging to three general categories, the primary 
motive being ‘Driving Technology Diffusion’. We contribute to existing knowledge by providing novel 
insights into the phenomenon of patent pledges and empirical evidence to what the literature has 
suggested. We argue that all motives of free patent pledges link to the overarching goal of fostering 
technology diffusion.  
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Introduction 
Over the past decades, firms have increasingly engaged in sharing their patent rights with other 
organisations. This has often been labelled a patent pledge which is defined as ‘a publicly 
announced intervention by patent owning entities (‘pledgers’) to out-license active patents to the 
restricted or unrestricted public free from or bound to certain conditions for a reasonable or no monetary 
compensation using standardized written or social contracts’ \cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}. Examples 
include Tesla Motors, Toyota, and Ford who announced that their active patents relating to 
alternative powertrains can be used for free (Tesla and Toyota) or for a reasonable fee (Ford). 
Furthermore, Microsoft, IBM, and Google applied multiple patent pledges in the area of 
information- and communication technology (ICT). To some extent these strategies seem to 
contradict the original purpose of patents as exclusionary rights. As it stands, several firms seem 
to be puzzled  by patent pledges, their purpose, validity, and ‘honesty’. They do not know how to 
react to these strategies and might even feel a certain distrust. In other words, they wonder: what 
motivates organisations and the relevant decision makers to share their patents?  
 
In an attempt to answer this question, some scholars across different disciplines have already 
attempted to address this issue, albeit existing research remains scarce and incomplete. Several 
studies investigate the motivations of revealing information in the context of so-called ‘collective 
inventions’ and the motivations behind open source software and open innovation (see for 
instance \cite{Schweisfurth2011} for an overview of motives for different models). However, 
only a few colleagues focus on patent rights specifically \cite{contreras2017patent, Ziegler2014}. 
While these studies deliver first very helpful insights, they derive their results from unsupported 
assumptions, logical reasoning, and limited empirical enquiry.  
 
This paper addresses that problem by providing empirical evidence from qualitatively analysing 
30 semi-structured interviews and secondary data from 50 patent pledges. The interviews have 
been conducted specifically in the context of the motivation behind patent pledges, whereas 15 
interviewees work or have worked in an organisation that applies or has applied at least one 
patent pledge in the past. Interviewees include heads of Intellectual Property (IP) departments 
of global organisations, patent attorneys, a former president of the US patent office, CEO’s of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s), and IP consultants. The data for the 50 patent 
pledges constitute publicly available statements of patent owners, in which they announce the 
broad availability of their patents. Through qualitative coding, we provide an empirical study that 
includes insights from experts that were directly involved in patent pledges. The coding process 
consists of two cycles of which the resulting categories have been validated using a blind 
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comparison of an independent researcher. We aim to supplement existing knowledge through 
the exchange with renowned IP experts, as well as through the analysis of secondary data.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: [To be added] 
 
Theoretical background 
Previous studies have shown that the notion of patent pledges lacks a consistent definition and 
that the disregard of different types leads to contradictory results \cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}. 
Similarly, the motives for these pledges lack a coherent classification. Often, the underlying 
rationale is mentioned in the context of sharing mechanisms other than patent pledges, which 
leads to contorted and blended results. Few attempts have been made to provide a 
comprehensive, broadly applicable taxonomy, and these few ask for further affirmation. 
Subsequent, we provide an overview of relevant studies that investigate these motives. However, 
we do not aim to provide a review relating to motives in all areas of open innovation and open-
source software. Rather, we focus on motives that have been investigated in the context of 
patents, specifically patent pledges. For an overview of general motives in the areas of collective 
inventions, user innovation networks, commons-based peer production, crowdsourcing, and 
open-source innovation, we refer to \cite{Schweisfurth2011}.  
 
The reason why many firms struggle to understand the phenomenon of patent pledges is because 
they focus on the private investment model, which assumes that private returns can be 
appropriated from innovation \cite{Demsetz1967, Hippel2003}. Patents as one form of IP act as 
an enabler for the private investment model, because they grant the inventor a temporary, 
exclusive right to appropriate direct returns on his investment \cite{Arrow1962}. In this model, 
any free disclosure of information will reduce the inventor’s profit and should therefore be 
avoided \cite{Hippel2003}. In contrast, the collective action model refers to the creation of 
innovation that requires the inventor to relinquish exclusionary rights and to make his invention 
available to the public \cite{Olson1971}. Unsurprisingly, the collective action model faces the 
problem to motivate firms and individuals to innovate, because their possibilities to appropriate 
a direct return for their investment are limited \cite{Hippel2003}. Nevertheless, some authors 
observe that innovators do benefit from sharing their know-how, at times even to a higher degree 
than from the traditional private investment model. 
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In his seminal paper, Allen (1983) investigates the free exchange of information in the English 
iron and steel industry of the 19th century, a phenomenon that he calls collective invention 
\cite{Allen1983}. He observed the recurrent behaviour that technical information was exploited 
by entities other than the firm who discovered it. However, Allen notes that this specific industry 
was characterised by non-appropriability, because many inventions were not patentable. He 
mentions increased output, difficulties to keep the information secret, and increased profits as 
possible rationales for firms to apply these strategies.  
 
When looking at Allen’s study on collective invention, one could easily disregard its applicability 
to patented inventions. Surprisingly, many modern studies find similar motives in industries that 
are saturated with patent rights. In doing so, they all share, at least to some extent, Chesbrough’s 
stance that a patent owner can profit from other’s use of his IP \cite{Chesbrough2003}. Some 
authors argue the the short-term reward through licensing-revenues is simply too myopic 
\cite{Alexy2009,Teece2018}. Following, we briefly summarise related studies. 
 
West and Gallagher (2006), while investigating open innovation in the context of open-source 
software, mention that IP might be given away to stimulate demand for related products 
\cite{West2006}. Similarly, Barnett (2011) describes what he calls voluntary forfeiture actions, 
and states that they occur primarily in platform markets that exhibit network effects 
\cite{Burnett2011}. The motive is to induce platform adoption, whereat the firms ‘generosity’ of 
forfeiting ownership or control rights follows from  economic self-interest \cite{Burnett2011}. 
Alexy, Criscuolo and Salter (2013) describe what they call selective revealing strategies 
\cite{Alexy2013}. In their study, innovators reveal knowledge either to create a new or to extend 
an existing (technological) path favoured by the focal firm. Hence, the authors argue that 
increased compatibility and higher adoption rates of the revealed technology motivate 
innovators to selectively reveal knowledge. This motive of increased technology adoption is also 
supported by Chien (2016), this time, however, specifically in the context of ‘patent waivers’ 
\cite{Chien2016}. The author also mentions PR and public concerns as drivers to conduct patent 
pledges. Rimmer (2018) again mentions increased platform adoption as a motive of patent 
pledges, this time specifically in the context of electric and fuel-cell vehicles and clean energy 
\cite{Rimmer2018}. The idea of increased technology diffusion through patent pledges relating 
to sustainable technologies is also taken up by Contreras, Hall, and Helmers (2018). They assess 
the success of the Eco-Patent commons, a non-profit initiative by large firms with the goal to 
pledge ‘green’ patents, and find that this specific pledge did not increase technology diffusion 
\cite{Contreras2018}.  
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This brief overview of studies shows, that the main motive of patent pledges, as mentioned in the 
literature, is to increase technology diffusion. Below we describe two other studies in more detail, 
Contreras and Jacobs (2017) and Ziegler, Gassmann and Friesike (2014) 
\cite{contreras2017patent, Ziegler2014}. We focus on thesm because they provide, to our 
knowledge, the only frameworks for motives specifically in the context of patent pledges. Both 
distinguish between four general rationales. Importantly, from a methodological perspective, it 
is not clear how the authors arrive at their taxonomies. 
 
Ziegler, Gassmann and Friesike (2014) propose a typology consisting of four different motives 
behind what they call patent releases, whereas they only consider patents that can be accessed 
without any monetary compensation \cite{Ziegler2014}. The authors distinguish motives 
according to their importance and the financial or non-financial motives of the patent owner. As 
mentioned above, increased technology diffusion is part of the author’s profit making motive, 
because firms try to achieve a dominant market position. Furthermore, better PR and serving the 
society are also mentioned as motives by the authors. Importantly, the study includes patent 
donations, which we conceptualize as distinctively different from patent pledges 
\cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}. Furthermore, the authors did not have access to patent managers 
directly involved in the free sharing of patents, which is why they relied on secondary sources 
\cite{Ziegler2014}.  
 
While Ziegler, Gassmann and Friesike (2014) focus on  patent releases that can be accessed 
without any monetary compensation, Contreras and Jacobs (2017) widen their definition of 
patent pledges by including the broad access to patents on reasonable fees into their analysis. 
Furthermore, they do not consider patent donations. Based on their extensive collection of about 
178 secondary data from organisations in multiple industries, Contreras and Jacobs (2017) 
provide (amongst the very few) the most detailed available framework for rationales behind 
patent pledges to date, \cite{contreras2017patent}. The authors distinguish four motives for 
firms to adopt patent pledges: ‘Inducement’, ‘Collective Action’, ‘Voluntary Restraint’ and 
‘Philanthropy’ while noting that these motives are not exclusive and can complement each other.  
 
Inducement refers to the goal of a firm to induce other market participants to adopt a technology 
favoured by the pledger. This is, according to Contreras and Jacob, the most common motive of a 
patent pledge and supports the studies cited above. According to the authors, the Inducement 
motive can appear in three forms, depending on the subject the company wants to circulate: 
‘Interoperability’, ‘Platform leadership’ and ‘Market development’. While interoperability aims to 
convince third parties to invest in a particular standard, platform leadership relates to a favoured 
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platform or ‘de facto standard’ of the pledger. With market development, on the contrary, the 
patent owner tries to induce the adoption of a broad technology area rather than specific 
standards or platforms.  
 
The Collective Action motives builds on the assumption that a certain activity would be beneficial 
for all participating parties, but only if enough parties participate. Therefore, firms hesitate to 
take action, because they are unwilling to invest without knowing if others will do the same. 
Barnett (2011) described this phenomenon earlier as ‘The Intertemporal Dilemma’ 
\cite{Burnett2011}. Contreras and Jacob (2017) state that Collective Action often occurs in an 
environmental context and refer to the Eco-Patent Commons as an example of a patent pledge in 
this category. According to the authors, a collective action induced patent pledge can help to 
reduce the hesitation of companies to participate 
\cite{contreras2017patent,Wen2016a,Alexy2013a}.  
 
Voluntary Restraint, on the contrary, relates to a firm’s commitment not to enforce or exploit 
specific patents in a predetermined manner. This sort of patent pledge aims to appease 
governmental bodies or courts in a way that is beneficial for the pledger, for example in the 
process of the approval of a company acquisition.  
 
Finally, Contreras and Jacob argue that some patent pledges seem to serve society rather than the 
company, which the authors allocate to the general Philanthropy motive. Chien (2016) supports 
this assumption by stating that sharing  Intellectual Property rights (IPRs) can have humanitarian 
reasons \cite{Chien2016}. However, the authors note that only a few pledges are truly 
philanthropic and that pledgers try to gain benefits through positive public relations (PR) or a 
stimulated market 
\cite{Fuller2010,Alexy2018,Schreier2012,raymond2001cathedral,Lerner2002}. Nevertheless, 
Contreras, Hall and Helmers (2018) conclude that PR seldom serves as the main motivation 
behind patent pledges\cite{Contreras2018}. Contreras and Jacobs (2017) provide a 
comprehensive taxonomy of motives for patent pledges that seems reasonable and exhaustive. 
However, the authors use logical reasoning to derive their results. It is desirable to conduct 
studies using primary data to amend  their taxonomy. 
 
To conclude, existing taxonomies for rationales behind patent pledges seem conclusive, yet they 
lack academic rigour. These existing studies rely on secondary data or on insights from people 
that were not involved in crafting and executing patent pledges.  
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Methodology 
Research Design 
We use case study research and utilise two main sources of data: interviews with IP experts and 
patent pledges released by firms and organisations. The justification for the decision of case study 
research is threefold: first, this research is exploratory in nature and aims to answer the why-
question ‘Why do firms conduct patent pledges’? By further taking into account that patent 
pledges are a contemporary phenomenon and that no controlled observation that uses 
manipulation is involved, case study research remains as the only appropriate method 
\cite{Yin2009,Benbasat1987,Dube2003}. Also, we have the ability to utilisie more than one 
source of evidence, which is an advantage compared to conventional historical studies 
\cite{Yin2009,Dube2003}. Second, we argue that previous studies have not satisfactory 
answered the research question, and therefore aim for theory building rather than theory testing 
\cite{Eisenhardt2007,Goffin2019}. While prior works mention motives for patent pledges, most 
of them do so in an unstructured and non-exhaustive way. The few studies that build taxonomies 
for motives rely on secondary data only or on people who have not been involved in a patent 
pledge. It is for this reason that we approach this research question from a clean slate 
\cite{Dube2003,Eisenhardt1989}. Third, case study research, specifically qualitative interviews, 
are widely used to investigate motives in a managerial context (e.g. 
\cite{Belal2007,Bansal2000}).  
 
Data Collection 
We collected two types of data: primary data through semi-structured interviews and secondary 
data that are publicly available.  
 
? Jonas Fabian Ehrnsperger, Frank Tietze (2019)  
DRAFT Motives for Patent Pledges: A Qualitative Study 
Figure 1: Research design 
We conducted a pilot study by interviewing eight CEO’s, founders, and other top-level managers 
of eight local SME’s in and around Cambridge, UK. The decision to conduct a pilot study stems 
from two reasons: first, standard literature for case study research suggests pilot studies in highly 
exploratory research \cite{Yin2009,Dube2003}. Second, at the beginning of our study, we did not 
know if interviewees that are not IP experts would deliver useful insights into the motives for 
patent pledges. We therefore specifically targeted top-level managers that (we assume) must deal 
with patents from time to time, but are not trained to do so. In doing so, we follow Yin (2009) in 
targeting geographically convenient cases that are unrelated to the cases for the main study 
\cite{Yin2009,Dube2003}. Depending on the outcome of the pilot study, we would then sample 
cases for our main study. Due to the non-IP-expertise of the pilot cases, we chose a broader, more 
general scope of questions than for the main cases \cite{Yin2009,Zinatelli1996}. The pilot study 
delivered two insights that were of importance for the further proceedings: first, the pilot cases 
were familiar with the topic of patent pledges, yet they were unanimously hesitant of these 
strategies. Two out of the eight participants presumed that they might apply similar strategies 
for the academic community or for reasons of sustainability in the future. However, as SME’s, they 
do not have the resources to do so at the time of the study.  
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Second, the pilot cases gave some insights into motives behind patent pledges in general, but 
these were all assumptions. Therefore, since our aim with this paper is to overcome assumptions 
in this field, we decided to change the theoretical sampling for the remaining study.  
 
We used the insights from the pilot study to refine our sampling methods. Specifically, we limited 
our sample to renowned IP experts that we chose ourselves and did not apply any geographical 
restriction. This procedure is known as theoretical sampling and is the suggested sampling 
method for case studies \cite{Glaser1967,Eisenhardt1989,Goffin2019}. We primarily chose IP 
experts that currently work or have worked for an organsiation that has applied at least one 
patent pledge in the past, or currently does so, because they constitute the units of interest that 
we are particularly interested in. We refer to these highly specialised cases as 'pledging 
interviewees’. To minimise the risk of biased results, we further include non-pledging experts in 
our sample, that is IP experts that have not worked in organisations that apply patent pledges. 
We define IP experts as individuals holding a university degree, being responsible for patent 
matters in an organisation, and, according to their own claim, knowing the subject of patent 
pledges in theory. In total, we conducted 22 one-to-one semi-structured interviews with experts 
from 16 distinct organisations. 15 of those 22 are pledging interviewees from 10 distinct pledging 
organisations, as defined by \cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}.  
 
Regarding the process of getting access to our cases, we applied two types of sampling methods: 
expert sampling and snowball sampling. First, we used expert sampling as a form of non-
probability sampling because the area of patent pledges requires insights from highly specialised 
individuals \cite{Daniel2012}. We selected pledging interviewees by directly contacting 
organsiations from the patent pledge dataset provided by \cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}. 
We also apply snowball-sampling \cite{Biernacki1981}, because IP is often perceived as a 
sensitive issue within an organisation and the matter of patent pledges requires input from 
insiders. The technique of snowball-sampling, which describes the referral of further contacts 
through a participant, helped us overcome, at least to a small degree, the problem of gaining 
access to qualified people. Six out of the 22 interviewees were referred to us through other 
participants, three of the six were pledging interviewees.  
 
Through these sampling methods, we gained access to senior IP experts, including presidents of 
IP departments of global firms, a CEO of a large community that aims to foster patent pledges, and 
a former president of a major patent office. All interviews lasted between 25 and 70 minutes and 
have been conducted via phone (14), video conference software (5), social-media exchange (2), 
and in person (1) between September 2017 and June 2019. Five interviews were held in the 
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German language, the rest in English. We recorded and transcribed the interviews in cases where 
the participants agreed for us to do so (in 11 cases) and we took notes in cases where they did 
not (in 11 cases). Since the unit of interest is small and responses could be easily linked to certain 
organisations or individuals, we anonymise the interviews and censor parts of the quotes in this 
paper.  
 
For the secondary data, we used the collection of patent pledges of a prior study 
\cite{Ehrnsperger2019a}. In total, we analysed 50 patent pledge statements and license 
agreements, each consisting of approximately 1 to 15 DIN A4 files.  
 
Data analysis 
Our choice of theoretical sampling according to \cite{Glaser1967,Eisenhardt2007} involves an 
argumentative generalisation during the process of data collection \cite{Mayring2007}. In 
particular, the gathered material is analysed by coding in the sense of inductive theory 
development \cite{Mayring2007}. In contrast to deductive categorisation, we did not a priori 
define categories for the codes, but used our research question as a guide \cite{Mayring2000}. 
We applied qualitative coding for both, the primary data resulting from the interviews and the 
secondary data from the patent pledge dataset. This is an established method for qualitative 
motive studies. For instance, Bansal and Roth (2000) used qualitaitve coding for in-depth 
interviews, participant observation, and archival documents to examine the motives why 
companies ‘go green’ \cite{Bansal2000}. To support the analysis, we used NVivo 12 software, 
which is a commonly used software for qualitative coding in innovation research (see e.g. 
\cite{Langner2015}). The software facilitated the coding process and allowed for an advanced 
comparison between data from different organisations and industries. We conducted two coding 
cycles following the approach suggested by \cite{Saldana2009}. For the first coding cycle, we 
used structural coding, since all elements in both our data sets are relatively standardised 
\cite{Saldana2009}. After this first coding cycle, we found that some of our codes were almost 
indistinguishable. For instance, ‘driving technology diffusion’ and ‘driving ecosystem industry 
growth’ were initially two distinct categories resulting from the first coding cycle. Therfore, we 
applied a second coding cycle, specifically pattern coding, to develop a smaller and more 
delimitable list of categories \cite{Saldana2009,Mayring2000,Goffin2011}.  
 
There has been much criticism about the reliability in qualtiative coding, because methods that 
enhance reliability are often overlooked \cite{Fahy2001,Campbell2013}. In particular the 
problem of discriminant capability due to a lack of exclusiveness amongst categories constitutes 
a major obstacle that needs to be adressed by more studies \cite{Fahy2001}. To minimise 
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discriminant capability, we outsourced the review and validation to a second independent 
postdoctoral researcher with IP expertise, who was not involved in this study \cite{Goffin2019}. 
The second author of this paper compared both categorisations and found no significant 
deviations in neither the concepts nor the terminologies. To clarify this, we provide an example 
for the aggregation of codes into a category: 
The first researcher held the view that the following codes from four interviewees should be 
allocated to one category, which he called ‘Improving and fostering technology and innovation’. 
‘It encouraged people to develop [...] that read on the functionality of the patents that [...] 
pledged.’;‘They really believe that more [...] drives innovation faster than really insular 
technology’; ‘The idea was that if he open-sourced the patent portfolio, this allows other players 
to engage and push the industry forward.’; ‘Different motive: Fostering technology’ (this last 
quote is a direct translation from German notes). The second researcher independently allocated 
the codes to one category, too, which she called ‘Fostering innovation and subsequent 
development’. As a final authority, the second author compared both results and a decision about 
the final wording was made.  
 
To derive results, we counted the occurrence of codes belonging to individual categories in both 
datasets (see appendix). In the past, there has been much debate and criticism about the use of 
numbers in qualitative research \cite{Maxwell2010}. We are aware of these discussions and 
emphasise that the frequency of codes should not be used as a conclusive measure of importance. 
Rather, the numbers indicate the course and the focus of the interviews. Furthermore, since the 
interviews varied in lengths, the mere consideration of absolute numbers would be misleading. 
However, we used numbers of distinct categories to support internal generalisability and 
diversity, as described by \cite{Maxwell2010}. To make our results more credible, we indicate 
especially important categories for individual interviewees. This approach is known as latent 
content analysis, which generally refers to the process of interpreting content 
\cite{Hsieh2005,Holsti1969}. Specifically, we used the language of the respondents and our own 
subjective judgement to determine this importance. For instance, if an interviewee responded 
with ‘this could/might be because…’ in a coded phrase, we would not consider this as particularly 
important, because the respondent made a presumption. This stays in contrast to ‘we did this 
because…’, which we would classify as strong evidence.  
 
Since the patent pledges are public statements that have been officially released by the respective 
organisation, we assume that every mentioned motive can be considered reliable. Therefore, to 
eliminate speculation from our side, we do not provide indicators for which organisation might 
show strong evidence for any given motive and count the categories and patent pledge statements 
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only. Furthermore, if more than one patent pledge is announced in the same statement, we do not 
distinguish between these pledges, because the allocation of motives to distinct pledges would be 
speculative. However, because the patent pledges have been officially released by organisations 
and are unlikely to disclose content that could harm the respective organisation, we focus our 
analysis on the anonymised interviews and use the patent pledge statements as 
supporting/opposing data.  
Results 
Fig. 2 shows lists all 15single motives that we derived fromcoded in both, the interviews and the 
patent pledge statements. According to the coding procedure described above We allocate these 
motives cluster into four general categories:, namely (i) two altruistic motives, (ii) seven 
managerial motives, (iii) four perceptional motives, and (iv) two technological motives.  
 
Figure 2: Motives of Patent Pledges 
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The motives arising from analysing the secondary datapatent pledges compared to the motives 
mentioned by thein the interviewees are, without considering the number of occurrences, 
generally speaking consistent. We put together all motives from both data streams to draw Fig. 1. 
However, not all motives arise from both data streams. Specifically, we did not find evidence for 
the motives ‘Encouraging competition’, ‘Showing social responsibility’, and ‘Fostering integrity’ 
in the interviews. Analogously, we did not find evidence for ‘Fulfilling funding obligations’ and 
‘Building reputation and PR’ in the patent pledge statements.  
 
In single cases, we find that the number of interviewees that show strong evidence for a specific 
motive and motives mentioned in the patent pledges differ significantly. The most extreme 
variance can be observed in the reputational motive ‘Building reputation and PR’. 58% of the 
pledging interviewees show strong evidence for this motive (38% when considering all 
interviewees). In contrast, none of the patent pledge statements mentions this specific motive. 
For a full comparison between the two data streams, we refer to the tables X and Y in the 
appendix. 
 
Table 1 below provides examples for the four most prominent motives according to the pledging 
interviewees with supporting quotes from the patent pledges.  
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Motives O. Selected interview quotes Selected patent pledge statement quotes 
Driving 
technology 
diffusion and 
ecosystem and 
infrastructure 
building 
~92 %  ‘The problem with electric vehicles and 
the fuel cell is another good example 
until you have the infrastructure build 
up, nobody is gonna make money 
selling those vehicles. Because nobody 
is gonna buy them. When you enforce 
your patents, what you are gonna do is 
hurt yourself by eliminating the market 
penetration for that particular type of 
product.’ 
  
‘View the world as a pie and I want to 
take the biggest slice. But if the whole 
world grows, your slice becomes 
bigger, too.’ 
  
‘We are in a very competitive 
marketplace where we have a [...] and 
we are competing against [...]. We want 
when customers are thinking about 
which one to choose, we have this 
additional benefit. We want customers 
to put value on that and we want to let 
them know that, when they choose our 
platform, they are gonna get this 
benefit from it.’  
  
‘It has to do with adoption of your 
technologies and your programs and 
surveys that show favorability of 
customers.’ 
  
‘We wanted to disseminate [...] 
technology.’ 
  
‘... in the world of [...], you want to 
encourage the industry to grow in 
tandem together.’ 
‘Our goal at Blockstream is to accelerate 
technological innovation in Bitcoin, 
building infrastructure and innovative 
tools to support its secure, trustless, 
decentralized nature. We believe that 
open innovation is necessary for the 
long-term success of Bitcoin, and 
because of this we intend for all of the 
technology developed at Blockstream to 
be freely available for the benefit of the 
Bitcoin community and the world. But 
we operate in an environment where 
good intentions are not enough, and 
must be backed by mechanisms that 
ensure those intentions are carried out.’ 
Source: Blockstream Patent Pledge 
(2017) 
  
‘By sharing our research with other 
companies, we will accelerate the 
????????????????????????????????????????
and deliver even better products to 
customers.’ 
Source: Ford Patent Pledge (2015) 
  
‘IBM wants to encourage broad adoption 
of the Covered Specifications....’ 
Source: IBM (13.07.2007) 
  
‘Tesla was created to accelerate the 
advent of sustainable transport, and this 
policy is intended to encourage the 
advancement of a common, rapidly 
evolving platform for electric...’ 
Source: Tesla Motors’patent pledge 
(2014) 
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‘Encourage other [...] companies to 
enter [...] space.’ 
  
‘The situation [...] drives [...] to open 
patents. [...] need new infrastructures, 
so we`d like to motivate them.’ 
 
‘As part of the efforts to popularise FCVs, 
Toyota Motor Corporation is allowing 
royalty-free se of about 5,680 of the 
FCVrelated patent licences [...]. To 
facilitate faster expansion of hydrogen 
station networks, Toyota will also 
provide royalty-free use of 
approximately 70 hydrogen station-
????????????????????????????????????????
those installing and operating hydrogen 
stations.’ 
Source: Toyota patent pledge (2015) 
  
Building 
reputation and 
PR 
~58 % ‘The optics that it looks good when you 
say 'You can use our patents for free'. 
When you end up in patent litigation 
with them, they can also wave this 
pledge in front of the jury and say 'But 
we said they can use our patents for 
free, and they are being really mean by 
trying to sue us'. It is about making 
other people look bad. ‘ 
  
‘And so [...] has been out there frankly 
being very much like 'Oh you know, 
maybe people should be thinking about 
me like Ghandi. I give away IP and I am 
a wonderful guy.'’ 
  
‘... move to position yourself as a white 
knight and being anti-patent and being 
free innovation and all that. But doing it 
at a time where he is not actually giving 
up that much.’  
N/A 
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Decreasing 
uncertainty and 
patent threats 
~50 % ‘... if you stumble upon one of Tesla's 
patents as your operating, it creates the 
ability to eliminate the fear of 
infringement. Because you have that 
free license.’ 
  
‘... we knew that we would not get in 
any legal fight with any of the 
competitors ....’ 
  
‘You are trying to send messages in 
addition to reconciling actual or 
perceived issues. You take tension out 
in places where tension is perceived. 
Whether you believe there is tension, if 
others believe there is, you have to deal 
with that.’ 
  
‘The OPN Pledge is designed to 
supplement existing OSS licensing 
alternatives, providing patent holders 
who care about reducing threats to OSS 
a more robust defensive capability 
against incoming patent aggression.’ 
Source: Google Open Patent Non-
Assertion pledge (2013) 
  
‘We will actively monitor for patent-
related threats to Linux and adjacent 
open source technologies and encourage 
open source community intellectual 
property-related initiatives.’ 
Source: Open Invention Network (2019) 
Supporting 
general society 
~42% ‘We are trying to share the benefits of 
the portfolio we have built up over a 
long period of time.’ 
  
‘It was not really to support any one 
company or a group of companies, the 
members did this really for the benefits 
of the entire community. Not because 
they wanted to get some benefits 
uniquely themselves.’ 
  
  
  
????????????????????????????????????
companies making electric vehicles, and 
the world.’ 
Source: Tesla Motors’ patent pledge 
(2014) 
  
‘We believe that open innovation is 
necessary for the long-term success of 
Bitcoin, and because of this we intend 
for all of the technology developed at 
Blockstream to be freely available for 
the benefit of the Bitcoin community and 
the world.’ 
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Source: Blockstream patent pledge 
(2017) 
 
Discussion 
[To be added] 
 
Conclusion 
This study has provided empirical evidence for the rationales why firms conduct patent 
pledges. Our results show that ‘Driving technology diffusion and ecosystem and 
infrastructure building’ is indeed the primary motive and confirms what the literature 
has suggested. Furthermore, the motives ‘Building reputation and PR’ and ‘Decreasing 
uncertainty and patent threats’ are of major importance. Despite their different names, 
we show that all motives for free patent pledges link to technology diffusion, either as 
upstream or downstream motives. Therefore, we expand the knowledge about this 
important phenomenon and strengthen its link to the vast literature about technology 
diffusion.  
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